Introduction
The market crisis has highlighted the design of our financial regulatory system and to a degree identified some tensions within our current system. In turn, this provides a natural opportunity to reflect upon the underlying objectives of regulation and how various regulatory goals can clash. This Article's approach will be to use a number of prominent examples from the market crisis and tie these to central objectives of regulation. In particular, I emphasize the interaction between a) a "Financial Stability Regulator" focused upon traditional prudential supervision and the "safety and soundness" of the financial system as a whole with b) a regulator focused upon "fair rules of conduct," which I refer to as a "Market Integrity Regulator." Of course, this bifurcation is an abstraction, 1 but a helpful one for understanding the potential conflict in regulatory goals.
In laying a background foundation for these two types of regulators, it's helpful to recognize the underlying market failures that give rise to these types of regulation. For example, an important role of a financial stability regulator is to limit the adverse consequences and externalities associated with systemic risk. Many commentators point to the transmission of adverse shocks through the financial system as a central aspect of systemic risk. From this perspective systemic risk should be viewed as such an externality or market failure. Indeed, banking regulators 2 This is somewhat analogous to a sports umpire rooting for a particular team (e.g., "the home team"). In a similar spirit I have been told that a former SEC Commissioner in describing the agency's role many years ago had remarked, "We're long." 3 In a somewhat different context senior government officials stretched their role by introducing some new terminology into the economic vocabulary during the spring of 2009. Due to their interest in buoying the economy, they used the term "green shoots" to signify that economic declines were slowing-though they were not comfortable assessing the state of the economy from the traditional perspective of whether the economy was declining or growing (as they would have needed to conclude that it was declining at a rapid rate). 4 The anti-manipulation theme directly relates to financial stability as well. individual banks would not "fail" the test, but could be required to obtain additional capital, there was considerable trepidation in the marketplace because of concern about the extent of potential dilution. Of course, the traditional disclosure requirements from the market integrity regulator are for disclosure of all material information. What could be more material than information about the financial viability of the firm and the need of the firm to accept further dilution? Yet the financial stability regulators did not specify an ex ante disclosure design, even though nondisclosure would not appear viable under the securities disclosure rules under which the firms operate. This illustrates the tension between financial stability regulators (who may be inclined towards not announcing the capital needs of individual financial institutions) and a hypothetical market integrity regulator that takes seriously the importance of disclosure, as part of its investor protection mission.
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The attitudes of the financial stability regulator became relatively more sympathetic to disclosure as it recognized that adverse selection was "infecting" the banking system and the bulk of large financial institutions. 10 Regulators recognized that at a minimum it was crucial to be able to "separate" the stronger institutions from weaker ones to avoid adverse selection at the market level and weakening the system. Still, an ex ante disclosure regime is particularly appealing because the disclosure decision becomes independent of the finding. This makes the actual stress test results stand on their own and not reflect selective disclosure. In contrast, in Spring 2009 it appeared that the regulators essentially had calculated preliminary results before deciding about their disclosure plans.
Indeed, there was considerable ambiguity about whether the results would be disclosed at all until a few weeks before the results were announced.
The potential difference between financial stability regulation and market integrity regulation is vividly illustrated during the week prior to the release of the stress test results in May 2009. The lack of an ex ante disclosure plan was particularly striking during that week. The widespread leaking of "partial results" then was dramatic, particularly in light of the substantial revisions that still were occurring. This was not a context in which "trial balloons" would likely have been anticipated. Indeed, had these "leaks" been about corporate earnings or other events, an SEC investigation of manipulation almost certainly would have been undertaken. Yet in the context of the stress test this author hasn't seen any reports about an investigation of such leaks and manipulation. In fact, given the centrality of the stress tests to the market, it is potentially an even more important matter than an investigation about leaks of earnings announcements.
All of this illustrates the difference in perspective between a financial stability regulator (whose focus is on stability of the system) and a market integrity regulator focused upon the integrity of disclosures. The supervisors and financial stability regulators have important information and perspectives that bear on the question of manipulation-both by corporate officials and regulators. The testimony of the relevant government officials is potentially germane, even acknowledging the potential claims of sovereign immunity by these officials as they would possess considerable information about whether the leaks were from government officials as well as the appropriateness of the disclosures by corporate executives.
While there are differences between a market integrity regulator and a financial stability regulator, an enhanced disclosure plan need not be adverse from the perspective of managing systemic risk. Indeed, many observers felt that the lack of transparency of the counterparty risk being borne by major financial institutions has been central to the systemic risk in our economy.
Arguably, the financial stability regulators, due to their inherent focus on the worst states, have not fully appreciated the potential value of promoting disclosure and transparency for limiting systemic risk. Whether full disclosure helps mitigate or encourage systemic risk is ambiguous. Interestingly, the SEC initially had not brought an action against Bank of America with respect to its failure to disclose its losses on the Merrill Lynch assets prior to the Bank of America shareholder vote, though failure to publicly disclose these losses was arguably much more significant (and the losses more unexpected) than Bank of America's failure to disclose the Merrill Lynch bonuses. The SEC filed a separate suit on this issue when Judge Rakoff ruled against allowing the SEC charges on the disclosure of Merrill Lynch's losses to be combined with the on-going litigation about the Merrill Lynch bonuses. 15 Of course, the testimony of senior federal officials would have been especially important with respect to a case focusing upon the disclosure of losses. Such testimony would be relevant even though the actions of the federal officials could be subject to sovereign immunity (as in the discussion of stress tests).
Presumably, sovereign immunity does not exempt government officials from testifying in disclosure cases related to the adequacy of corporate disclosure by firms and their senior executives.
It is striking in this context that the financial stability regulators perceived that they had a huge vested interest in the completion of the merger. Of course, a market integrity regulator is not viewed as possessing a strong vested interest in the outcome. Instead, it is the enforcer of the federal securities laws, including its disclosure requirements. This example strongly illustrates the potential for considerable tension between managing systemic risk and the adequacy of 
Enforcement Actions
The various Bank of America disclosure examples use a tangible and widely discussed situation in which the financial stability regulator perceived that it had effective ownership and strong preferences about how disclosure should be handled. It also makes sense to consider a related question in the context of a financial stability regulator to reflect upon situations in which the government effectively owns a significant portion of the firm. Suppose hypothetically that the government owns much of a firm against which the market integrity regulator would like to bring an enforcement action. This raises the question of what it means to bring such an action.
For example, given the substantial government ownership in such firms as Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac and Citigroup, this raises the question of the efficacy of enforcement actions in such cases.
Somewhat in parallel, there has been serious substantive debate about the appropriateness of corporate sanctions, but much of the focus in this debate has shifted to the appropriateness of the market integrity regulator being too "weak."
Short Sales
An important aspect of market design that has proved highly controversial during the last few years has been the debate about short-sale regulation. While this paper is not a suitable forum to emphasize all aspects of that debate, short-sale regulation does provide a helpful example that illustrates the potential for disagreement and conflict between financial stability and market integrity regulators. A highly complicated and often criticized decision by the Securities and Chairman Chris Cox, he characterized as "the biggest mistake" that he had made at the SEC as listening to the advice of the President's Working Group and imposing the short-sale ban. 17 This illustrates the potential for dramatic differences in viewpoint between the market integrity and financial stability regulators. The former chairman's later perspective on the ban undoubtedly reflected a variety of factors including the operational problems that the ban created in the marketplace (in fact, until options market makers were exempted this almost led to closure of options trading because of the inability of market makers to hedge) and liquidity shocks that hedge funds experienced and transmitted. Many critics of short selling (and arguably the SEC itself) had blamed short sellers for the prior dramatic declines in the valuation of financial services firms rather than the risk management practices of those firms and potentially the broader costs associated with illiquidity and unpredictable government policies. 18 Economics teaches that asset values decline (even absent short selling) when buyers are not willing to pay as much as previously (indeed, there are many potential buyers in the economy compared to short sellers due to the high frictional costs of short selling).
firms in all aspects of the marketplace, it is striking that at least some weighed in so aggressively against the arbitrage and trading aspects of their firms' traditional business. The comment by
Chairman Cox during his wrap-up interview reflects the view that not all wisdom about regulation would be based within financial stability regulators and that there are important institutional differences in perspective among regulators. 20 It is important to recognize that the role of financial regulators is not to "wish" for high asset prices, but to have a fair process for equilibrating market forces.
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One of the major ongoing costs incurred by the market integrity regulator by this ban was a continuing lack of clarity about how market design might be altered in the event of future crises.
An important dislocation that resulted in the immediate aftermath of the ban was the huge stresses that hedge funds faced, which resulted in considerable withdrawal of liquidity from the marketplace. It is hard to see how such developments could be viewed as positive, either in the short term or over the longer run.
Fair Value Accounting
Considerable attention has been paid during the financial market crisis to the accounting disclosure system, which defines the accounting rules for information production that would be most useful. While the traditional purpose of the design of accounting rules is to establish an information production system that would be of the most use to equity investors, it is striking that the financial stability regulator and bank supervisors as well as many market participants feel that they have a vested interest in the outcome. Analogously, banking officials feel that they have a vested interest in the accounting treatment. 22 While fair value accounting itself has been very controversial-indeed, an interesting conceptual argument against fair value accounting for the "toxic" assets is that the valuation changes in the market reflect changes in the pricing of risk and liquidity, an important issue deserving more attention is whether financial and regulatory accounting should be bundled together. 23 24 Financial stability regulators have been reluctant to depart from the financial accounting system for regulatory purposes. At the core of many of the complaints against fair value accounting is in its use for regulatory accounting and especially for the determination of an institution's capital requirements. However, this is not obviously the goal of an underlying financial accounting system that would be selected by a regulator oriented towards market integrity.
Market-Based Approaches to Options Expensing
Though it does not fit the setting of a financial stability regulator, an interesting example that illustrates the market integrity regulator context and the preferences of an interested party among alternative outcomes is the nature of the regulatory standard for accounting for market-based approaches to option expensing. The goal is to select a measurement procedure that measures 22 For example, the American Bankers Association is not supportive of fair value accounting and on "safety and soundness" grounds wants to allow a systemic risk regulator to determine accounting disclosures for financial firms. ECON. 64 (2010) . 24 To what extent are legal restrictions an impediment to unbundling, i.e., is it problematic for the regulator to have discretion incremental to the accounting standard?
and estimates the expenses most accurately. Like the analogy to a financial stability regulator, this suggests that the measurement objective and standard should not be one that reflects the vested interest of one of the parties. Of course, in the options expensing context the registrant issuing options will favor a marketed instrument and mechanism that leads to relatively low valuations. The registrant is much more likely to issue such market-based options provided they can design the instrument and trading process to obtain low valuations (the registrant, like the financial stability regulator in much of this paper, has a vested interest in the outcome). But this is simply not the objective of the accounting standard and the criterion that reflects the market integrity regulator's objective. 25 Indeed, the extent that the registrant has the ability to select among alternative approaches would influence whether the objective of the accounting standard will be satisfied.
Concluding Observations
The examples that we cite illustrate the illusive nature of reaching regulatory goals and the potential conflicts in achieving those goals. Given the conflict in goals between different regulators and how these conflicts should operate in diverse contexts, it is not clear what is the best regulatory policy in specific situations. 26 But it seems problematic to be encouraging One might conclude from this discussion of the multiplicity of regulatory goals that this be best handled by explicitly empowering diverse regulators. The various contexts discussed here certainly suggest that a single regulator would not emphasize goals that it didn't feel important, but, of course, a primary regulator could largely ignore or bully the secondary regulator in any case. Still, the financial stability regulator shouldn't necessarily be the "king" regulator. The benefits to enhanced disclosure and greater transparency in allowing the marketplace to manage systemic risk, while ambiguous, have been under-emphasized. For example, starting in late 2007 this proved to be a central issue with respect to the management of counterparty risk in the marketplace, which was at the heart of the crisis. Contrary to the generic reaction of financial stability regulators in many contexts, disclosure and management of systemic risk need not conflict.
While we have focused upon conflicts between the financial stability and market integrity regulators, in fact, in some settings the financial stability and market integrity regulators are the same entities. For example, the FSA (United Kingdom) serves as both a financial stability and market integrity regulator. In some United States contexts, such as for money market funds and clearinghouses, the regulator responsible for market integrity issues also is responsible for financial stability concerns.
try to coordinate to resolve it is illustrated by attempts by the G-20 to address compensation practices and "say on pay" rules in the face of different compensation models internationally.
